YES. Let me splurge out here and talk about some ROTK scenarios that are finally possibly replicable if they do this right:
Of Zhuge Liang's 6 northward campaigns to break the three-kingdom deadlock, we know a major pet theory is that Kongming was ultimately too conservative and careful to take the risks necessary to beat Wei multiple times Shu's strength. In each case Sima Yi basically successfully defended by sitting tight and waiting it out. The Wei Yan records note that in the first invasion, Wei Yan suggested that he take a shortcut through a difficult mountain route to threaten the Wei rear and thus take Chang'an.
Below shows an approximation of Wei Yan's suggested route (red on the right) through rough mountains. Zhuge Liang ultimately opted to use the flatter terrain west (yellow line) to capture Qishan (little mountain icon along the yellow line), and then basically tick all the boxes grabbing castles and key roads on the road East into Wei territory.
Notably, the Wei Yan records show that he requested
5,000 elite soldiers to mount the attack - supported by 5,000 men to "carry provisions". A 1:1 ratio of dudes to carry food even for an elite force, precisely because they could not count on a traditional supply line.
Additionally, Wei Yan insisted that once he captured Chang'an (blue dot at the end of the red line above) with a surprise attack, he would be able to
use provisions left by the Wei to hold out until the main army arrived. And it is widely thought that this was one of the risks that made Zhuge Liang turn down the offer - the danger of Wei Yan's vanguard taking the castle but then being stuck in it without provisions was too great, a fate that befell many generals; Zhuge Liang himself often enjoyed the tactic of letting enemies take a small castle then holing them up inside it, forcing them to surrender or risk coming out to get provisions.
(In at least one Romance tradition, Wei Yan gets so butthurt that he never got to try, and that all 6 of Zhuge Liang's campaigns failed anyway, that this was the catalyst for his ultimate rebellion on Shu when Kongming copped it.)
Finally, while many scholars & nerds have lamented that Wei Yan's attack might have succeeded where Zhuge Liang ended up failing,
Kongming's own strategy was centred around the need for a reliable supply route. The above map shows how Shu and Wei are separated. When Shu originally took Hanzhong (south plains area in map) by Huang Zhong kicking the shit out of Wei & killing Xiahou Yun, it was a major coup for Liu Bei because Hanzhong is such a fantastically defensible position. But conversely, that means marching
out of Hanzhong was now a major problem for Zhuge Liang. We know that he marched on Qishan
six times because he thought he needed that yellow path to secure a reliable long term supply route for the conquest of Wei.
Ultimately, Zhuge Liang's strategic options were always compromised by the problem of supply routes - forcing him to seek a quick resolution, or to retreat and come back next year at great expense. Even though Wei's armies were always larger, the bottleneck was that the numerically inferior Shu army still had to win several major victories in a row to prevent starvation.
So even a basic set of mechanics where you have to defend the supply routes behind you, plan your next attack based on how to extend the supply, and have large armies retreat from lack of grain, would be FABULOUSLY OPTIMISTIC indeed