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Sierra Al Lowe talks about how Sierra Online collapsed

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Great read.

Al seems like a really kind and pretty down-to-Earth dude. I always forget that he had a career before even getting into game design, but I bet he was the kind of teacher that kids really loved and remembered.
 

buzz

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Wait, the company that agressively bought them was called CUC?

They were literally cucked! :lol:

Anyway, I'm tired of the same "empty suits are evul!" stories. The company Al Lowe is talking about is the same one who bought Blizzard, how come that one didn't fail but on the fucking contrary actually prospered?
People like to put a blame on invisible companies for "ruining" everything and not taking risks and shit ... except Sierra during those years were publishing stuff like Half Life and Homeworld.

Come on, Sierra was already shit by the point they sold. I mean, I love both Phantasmagoria games and The Beast Within, but let's be honest, jumping on the "interactive movie"/FMV train with that kind of shlocky B-level bullshit is not funny, telling an interesting story, creative, risque or anything that Al Lowe selectively remembers about Sierra. The sequel to Phantasmagoria was particularly a giant bomb. Ken and Roberta were old and tired people, wanting to retire and get out of an increasingly competitive market.

I remember reading about all of this from Ken Williams himself, he used to be fairly active in the SierraGamers forum. I've looked it up a bit, here are two interesting posts from him:

http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.4068.19339
(re: Did you ever regret selling Sierra?) One thing I never saw though is a brief and sincere reply if you ever regret selling.

Giovanni:

Honestly .. this is not an easy question. Because of what happened, there is no doubt that if I had it to do over again, I would not have sold. That said, there is no way I could have known how things would turn out.

I wanted to sell.

Running Sierra was far more intense than you could ever imagine. The entertainment business collects people with large egos, and immense talent. Sierra's staff was amazing, but also tough to manage. I was being pulled 50 different directions. Wall Street wanted consistently growing quarterly revenues and profits. My staff wanted to refine and improve products forever. Our competitors also made my life tough - in some categories, it was a "keeping up with the Jones'" market - - meaning that our product would only succeed if it was the best in the category. For instance, I would budget $1 million for a flight simulator, and promise everyone a June release date -- and, then a competitor would launch a flight sim that was better -- at which point I had to raise the budget on my product, and announce a new ship date -- and, on and on. There were great days at Sierra, but few easy ones.

After nearly 20 years of running Sierra, I was ready for retirement. My primary focus though, throughout my time at Sierra, and a line everyone heard from me often was "I want to build a company that my grandkids can enjoy." I was always focused on the future. At Sierra we tried to build brands, and series, and technologies, that would survive long past when I was gone.

During the negotiations to acquire Sierra, I outlined to the purchasers how I thought the transition should be handled. They shared with me their vision for how Sierra would be integrated into the larger organization -- which was unacceptable. I declined the deal, because I dd not want Sierra to fail. The next day, the acquirers gave in, and gave me the power I was demanding, post-deal, to ensure that Sierra could make the transition.

Unfortunately, the power I thought I would have to ensure that Sierra made the transition from being a "Ken and Roberta-centric" company to a division of a large corporation, never materialized. It was clear post acquisition, that I would not be able to have much influence over Sierra's direction. Had I known this, the deal would not have been done. I wanted to retire, but not to the extent that I would do something that wasn't in the best interests of Sierra's customers, employees and shareholders.

-Ken W
[/quote]

http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.54746.431962
I just had the chance to buy Sierra back, and passed.

There are many reasons.

1) I am busy boating, and that is taking all of my time (see www.kensblog.com)
2) It takes a LOT of money to build a game these days, and I don't have that kind of money, and don't really want to get into fund-raising mode. This is the wrong time to try to raise money.
3) I'm "over the hill." Great games are built by people who are in touch with the target audience. I'm 55 now! I'm not sure I relate to the gaming demographic anymore.
4) I have www.talkspot.com .. a website making company (this site is built on a 5 year old version that has never been updated, so don't think this is representative). Talkspot is doing VERY well and I'm overloaded working on it.
5) Roberta is busy on a book about the irish immigration. She isn't thinking about anything except her book.

I do plan to add games to talkspot.com when I get some time (they would be widgets that people building sites can add to their sites). Talkspot has a huge amount of traffic across our sites. A widget would immediately have critical mass, and I have some cool ideas for multiplayer games. I'm thinking on a two-year timeframe, not tomorrow.

-Ken W

So yeah, even if there were obvious corporate bullshit in this business, I personally think it's fair to say it was more a case of Sierra veterans not wanting and not being able to keep up with the way gaming development turned in the late 90s. King's Quest 8 didn't turn into a 3D action-adventure bullshit because of corporate whores, but because Roberta and Ken wanted that just after the success of Doom. Shit, they even had multiplayer in mind at some point :lol:
If you look up the "corporate involvement" related to Mask of Eternity, you'll be surprised to find out that the suits who mingled actually wanted a non-violent, non-combat version of the game (of course, for more conservative reasons rather than caring about the :incline: but that's besides the point).



Anyway, my point is, it's easy to blame the suits and the corporate nobodies for whatever shit happened. But after a bajillion kickstarter campaigns where indie people failed to meet their fans' expectations and did all sort of stinky compromises and bullshit, just after one initial wave of game development, I can no longer believe this. There has to be a bigger fault associated with developers and "creative types" than we get in these stories after In-"let's do a console port because money!"-Xile and Double "I'm making games for my kid" Fine and Frontier "Always online DRM" Developments pulled the same bullshit publishers did before.

I really hope that at the end of the 2010s, the hipster/indie/neo-hippie phase will end and everybody will seriously return to the times when companies were business savvy, delivered quality products and had mass appeal because they knew how to treat their customers and how and when to innovate, no matter how big or small they were.
 
Unwanted

Musaab

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I'm a big fan of Al Lowe. But when I think of the Paul drama, all I can think is: Jews.

I was hoping they would remake the other Larry games and then even make a new one. But I guess that's not going to happen and even if it happens, it will suck.
 

Taluntain

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It's not really that there aren't any good games with good stories any more, they're just significantly harder to discover among the onslaught of titles with a mostly twitch target demographic. 15+ years ago, fewer titles were getting released so it was much easier to keep up with the good ones. Today, it's very hard for a regular gamer to keep up with even a fraction of what's getting released and since there's a large amount of repetition among the biggest (and usually "safe bet", most heavily promoted) titles, it's easy to get the impression that that's all that's getting released, which isn't really the case. It gets easier if you go a decade or two back via GOG - I've played a lot of great games growing up, but still missed out on many awesome titles so I'm enjoying myself looking them up on GOG and going through them now.
 

Sceptic

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Anyway, I'm tired of the same "empty suits are evul!" stories. The company Al Lowe is talking about is the same one who bought Blizzard, how come that one didn't fail but on the fucking contrary actually prospered?
People like to put a blame on invisible companies for "ruining" everything and not taking risks and shit ... except Sierra during those years were publishing stuff like Half Life and Homeworld.
:hmmm:

It's like the whole CUC/Cendant scandal and trial never happened. Hell Lowe even gave you the key words to just google the damn thing. It was all over the (non-)gaming news in the mid-90s.

By the time "Sierra" published Half-Life, the Sierra that Williams had formed had ceased to exist. The Williams, Lowe, the Two Guys from Andromeda, Mandel, everyone was gone. It was just a label that Cendant used for a completely unrelated company, it was as related to the old Sierra as the current "Atari" is to the original. Hell they weren't even a developer anymore.

And yeah, publishing Half-Life, the ultimate over-scripted linear shooter, was a big risk :roll:

Homeworld was after the Cendant scandal was in full force and IIRC Activison now owned the company, and they had nothing to do with Cendant. And hey look at that point Sierra was doing better... just like Blizzard! I'm sure this had nothing to do with the lawsuit and the corruption scandal that hit Cendant though, I'm sure Lowe made it all up just so he could blame some invisible company for "ruining" everything :roll:

At least do a tiny bit of research before spouting nonsense.
 

buzz

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But I've did the research, that's why I came with the posts an everything.

It's like the whole CUC/Cendant scandal and trial never happened. Hell Lowe even gave you the key words to just google the damn thing. It was all over the (non-)gaming news in the mid-90s.
Like I said, I was well aware of that. What I'm trying to say is that it was only a killing blow to a slowly decaying Sierra, not the thing that turned them from a glorious company to nothing.


By the time "Sierra" published Half-Life, the Sierra that Williams had formed had ceased to exist. The Williams, Lowe, the Two Guys from Andromeda, Mandel, everyone was gone. It was just a label that Cendant used for a completely unrelated company, it was as related to the old Sierra as the current "Atari" is to the original. Hell they weren't even a developer anymore.
See, this is the bullshit I'm talking about. This is plain untrue for several reasons:
- most of them actually worked on video games. Some of them were cancelled, some of them were released, but they were shitty, overbudgeted and using new technology that they couldn't grasp.

- Two Guys from Andromeda split up by Space Quest IV. Mandel left before the buyout (yes, I know he blames the suits as well, just like every tragi-comic artist developer in this fucking entertainment business). Space Quest 7 was in the works (with Scott Murphy back) but it was cancelled for various reasons. Sure, we can blame the suits again but let's not pretend it a smooth ride just until CUC bought them out and then it suddenly went mega-bumpy. The Space Quest franchise was already slowly drawing its last breath by that point.
- QfG was released in 98 with Lori Ann Cole as designer. From what I've read on the Internet, Sierra didn't even want to do a new Quest for Glory but succumbed to fan pressure.
- I've already covered Roberta Williams, King's Quest 8 and Phantasmagoria.
- Jim Walls left after PQ3, long before the buyout.
- Gabriel Knight in 99 by Jane Jensen.
- Sierra was already trending towards the publishing business before the buyout. I recall both Dynamix and Impressions games were bought by the early 90s, as well as other companies. And this was Ken's doing, not the job of CUC/Cendant or Hamas or Vivendi.

If you read some of the interviews and articles from the net about these games and Sierra games at that point, you'll notice how many of them thought it was necessary to go for 3-D graphics and/or multiplayer, or how the "low sales" of Grim Fandango just made everyone lose faith in the adventure genre. And this comes from the mouth

I know, it's prettier to imagine that everything at Sierra was all sunshine, everyone was nicely developing beautiful and complex 2-D adventure games, bringing back a more complex parser and having fun all around. Then the evil corporate people burst into the door, put a gun to Ken Williams' head and took over the company, then shat on everything because they hated making money or something.

Look, I'm not saying that the suits were innocent or something, that's far from the reality. FFS, that guy Forbes is in jail as we speak, he was obviously a giant asshole. I'm just saying that Sierra people deserve a big part of the blame as well IMO. Again, I'm not the biggest fan of Blizzard but you can't deny that this company was under similar circumstances and managed to pull it off with more than grace. Starcraft was also delayed as fuck, filled with technological and development issues. They also cancelled an adventure game around that time. Both Sierra and Blizzard at the time were big, best sellers on the PC market yet only one of them thrived into the 21st century. It's a bit unfair to accuse Sierra of being 100% corrupted by empty suits, yet Blizzard was allowed to do whatever they fuck they wanted and make games millions of people love.

And yeah, publishing Half-Life, the ultimate over-scripted linear shooter, was a big risk :roll:
Hey, that's what I read. Valve was a starting company with no previous background in making video games and doing an overly-ambitious title. Here's an old article talking about it:
https://web.archive.org/web/2013071...espot.com/features/halflife_final/part24.html

The Right E-mail, the Right Time
With the team in place, the time had come for Valve to find a publishing partner. It had been mostly smooth sailing for them up until this point, but they were about to meet a strong cross-wind. "It was sort of weird going from Microsoft where you were really respected to going into a meeting with a game publisher who said, 'Go away, stop bugging me! Come back with credibility!'" remembers Newell.

He recalls one meeting in particular that didn't turn out as planned.

The presentation was proceeding as normal, when it was mentioned that Valve wanted to use a skeletal animation system (animating the characters using digital bones and joints) in the game. As soon as they suggested such a concept, "the publisher said, 'OK, meeting's over!' They didn't believe we could do it," says Newell, with a wide I-told-you-so grin.


But their luck turned when Newell e-mailed another Seattle publisher, Sierra On-Line. Ken Williams, industry legend and Sierra On-Line founder, received the message. Williams recalls that when he got the e-mail from Newell, "I had been looking aggressively for some product in the Quake genre. I was looking at licensing one of the 3D shooter engines and was negotiating with id and some others."

Fortunately for Valve, it had the advantage of a secured Quake engine license. Williams was intrigued. "Gabe said he had the license and a team of ex-Microsoft people put together. It was the right e-mail at the right time."

A meeting was set between about ten Valve staffers and Sierra in November of 1996. On that fateful day, it snowed in Seattle, an extremely rare occurrence that basically shuts the entire city down. But as Harrington says, "There was no way we weren't going to show up. We all get in my four-wheel drive car, slid around, and finally get to Sierra." The entire office building was vacant, except the one person who made it into work: Ken Williams.

Valve began its pitch and, as Newell recalls, "About 20 or 30 minutes into the presentation, when we were just starting to gear up for our big close, Ken says, 'OK, you're done! Let me tell you why you should be working with Sierra rather than anyone else.'" They had caught him - hook, line, and sinker.

"Valve were the first ones who were using an existing [game] engine as a starting point, not a finishing point."
- Ken Williams
What impressed Williams so much about the Valve team? "Most of the [developers] I spoke with were groups of artists and designers, but no engineers," he states. "Valve were the first ones who were using an existing engine as a starting point, not a finishing point."

In addition, by 1996, Sierra had started to feel the pain of not having products in hot genres such as action and real-time strategy. It was time to make a move.

"We needed to get into the 3D shooter category," Williams says. "I did like Doom, but I saw it as a one-trick pony. By the time I decided we wanted into the genre, we were too far behind. With 20/20 hindsight, I blew it when I had the chance to buy id and didn't."

You read that right. Sierra had the opportunity to purchase id Software in the early '90s, but the deal broke down over a couple hundred thousand dollars that Sierra didn't want to put up front. But Williams didn't get mad, he got even. "Valve was the first group I had spoken with that could put Sierra in front of id," says Williams.


Shortly after the meeting with Valve, Williams left Sierra, and the torch was passed to Scott Lynch, the man who has briskly reinvigorated Sierra under the new label Sierra Studios. "Sierra got a little comfortable in the early '90s," he says. "We turned into a factory instead of a creative colony... We weren't seen as an innovative company." Valve had the potential to change all that.

But Lynch did have his concerns. "I think the big question with Valve right from the beginning was, 'OK, you've got the Quake engine, but is this just going to be new Quake levels?" he says. "What we all wanted to see was Valve take the technology as a foundation and add something new. When they started talking about telling a story and creating a persistent world, it was pretty obvious they weren't going to do a mission pack with the Quake engine." Sierra was interested and confident. They signed Valve up for a one-game deal.

The game was code-named Quiver.

Also some little insight into the kind of thought process that was running into Sierra at the time. In my honest opinion, if Sierra thrived through the 90s and early 00s, it would've been a giant asshole publisher company seeking to make the largest profit, keep following the trends, maybe even moving their games to consoles just like everyone did eventually.



Homeworld was after the Cendant scandal was in full force and IIRC Activison now owned the company, and they had nothing to do with Cendant. And hey look at that point Sierra was doing better... just like Blizzard! I'm sure this had nothing to do with the lawsuit and the corruption scandal that hit Cendant though, I'm sure Lowe made it all up just so he could blame some invisible company for "ruining" everything :roll:
Well, you're technically right. But it's not like Homeworld was developed and released in 1999, it started back in 1997 or so. Also, Sierra ws not doing better during the Havas/Vivendi years, that's when the actual layoffs started. Of course, the scandal with Cendant started everything but it wasn't that company that fired Al Lowe and Scott Murphy, it was the one that bought them next.
Also, I'm not sure what's with the "... just like Blizzard!" comment. Blizzard was part of Cendant just like Sierra, then they were sold to Vivendi just like Sierra was.

I'm not saying Al is making up things, just that he's slightly distorting the narrative a bit. For about a decade we kept hearing this narrative on how publishers/evil suits/assholes ruined Sierra and Interplay and Double Fine, but when you finally put these people to the test and give them money upfront to make games again, they stumble just like they did at that point. SpaceVenture might turn out great, but Hero-U? Yeah, there's talk of a second kickstarter campaign and shit.


I'm sure most of them mean well and I'd be the happiest camper if their games turn out to be good and we get more and more adventure games and cRPGs in the future. It's just that I'm tired of this narrative of "publishers ruin everything!" because it doesn't seem such an obvious truism nowadays.
 

Deuce Traveler

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It was the opposite. I never looked back. I wasn't as severe as Roberta. Roberta just took a private vow to never again speak about her past or about her history or about her games and output and place in the business.

I know this quote has already been bandied about on this thread already, but I just wanted to add that this part and a handful of others were heartbreaking to read.
 
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But I've did the research, that's why I came with the posts an everything.
Like I said, I was well aware of that. What I'm trying to say is that it was only a killing blow to a slowly decaying Sierra, not the thing that turned them from a glorious company to nothing.

Few things:
When Sierra was acquired in 1996, they were literally on top of the industry. They were consistently the market share leader in PC gaming even up to the time of the sale. They were a publicly traded company whose stock numbers were doing leaps and bounds yearly, which is what made them a hot buy at the time. Sierra as an adventure game company might have been in decline, but as a company they were on top of the world at that time. They were an aggressively expanding empire; In 1995 alone, Sierra acquired a dozen smaller companies to add to their development. So, they weren't decaying in the sense that they were in decline; they were on the way up. Business profiles from the time cited their main competition as being EA and Microsoft; They had over 1,000 employees located in 15 different studios around the globe in a time when a game company of that size, at least in PC gaming, wasn't that common.

Immediately after they were bought by CUC in the hostile takeover, CUC began using Sierra's accountants and Sierra's name in their illegal transcations. CUC's scheme was they (CUC) were basically broke and they used the companies they bought to inflate their income, making CUC appear like a monster in terms of profitability. This wouldn't come out until a year and a half after the acquisition.

Internal conflicts began. CUC had promoted the buyout to Ken as being a merger of Sierra and Davidson & Associates (who owned Blizzard), with Bob Davidson running the entire software division. Ken said no They then worked out a structure where there would be a software board of directors (which would feature himself, Sierra's President, Bob Davidson and a few CUC people). This board would make major decisions for the software division, including cutting product lines and such. He was also to be made a Vice President of CUC, which in theory would put him above Bob Davidson, and he would remain head of Sierra's R&D.

After the deal was done, none of this happened. Ken was 'promoted' but found his office gave him little power over the software end of the business. The software board only met once. He and Bob Davidson began having intense territorial conflicts. The Davidsons were religious nuts and they used their power to cut the advertising for Phantasmagoria (which was a megaseller, it had sold 1 million copies in just a month) and they even wanted to take the Leisure Suit Larry games off of store shelves. Within a few months, Davidson left the company, and instead of putting Ken in charge, they hired a guy named Chris MacLeod who had no prior computer game experience. Ken, seeing he had been duped and was now powerless, left the software division after a year in late 1997. Not long after, Sierra's President, who was Ken's handpicked successor, left. MacLeod then broke Sierra into three business units, each with a Senior Vice President, no clear CEO, which fucked up the internal structure of Sierra.

However, in the meantime (in 1997-1998), Sierra only grew. They acquired more companies, they signed Half-Life; they were considered in '97 to be the leader, the biggest developer in the industry. There were no lay-offs.

The adventure game corner of the company suffered. For example, KQ8 was conceived of as pretty much a traditional adventure game, with some limited action elements. The new heads were looking at Tomb Raider and Myst and wanting more and more elements of those games put into KQ. As a result, Roberta lost control of her project and became incredibly depressed and even wanted her name taken off KQ8 at one point because of all this crap. The new senior staff put a team of project managers above her, who told her team not to listen to her; it was a mess.

There was also the fact that Sierra's name began to be used by CUC for products Sierra didn't make. Stay Tooned was one such product. They had the idea of cross-marketing their various subsidiaries.

There was also the idea on the part of the new management that every adventure game had to be multiplayer. This is why SQ7 never really happened; there's no way to make a good SQ and have it be multiplayer. But, the rest of the company was doing very well. They had many year-to-year products like NASCAR and others as well as PrintArtist; they were very much in the black. Things were only looking bleak for the adventure side of the company.

Then in early 1998, the scandal was uncovered. And because Sierra's accountants and name had been used in the illegalities, Sierra as a company suffered a crippling blow to their profitability, and many Sierra employees' 401ks. Sierra went from being massive to crippled overnight.

Blizzard was saved from a lot of this because they were part of Davidson & Associates. Blizzard was so small at the time - having only 100 employees - their accountants weren't used. Davidson's were, and Davidson ceased to exist as a company not long after.

So, then, Sierra and Blizzard were sold again to Havas. Havas in turn was sold to Vivendi. Sierra got a new CEO who was at the helm of a massive but financially wrecked company, and so he shut down a bunch of studios and shut down the company's adventure game department. He also decided Sierra would no longer develop games in-house; they would become a publisher for third party developers to save money.

Then, he left and Vivendi hired yet another new CEO for Sierra. This guy's previous experience was working at Nabisco. So you had from 1997 through 2001:

-Ken demoted from Sierra CEO to 'sort of consultant', who then left.
-Sierra broken in late 1997 into three business units with no clear CEO, who reported to some guy who never had any computer game industry experience.
-The hiring of a CEO who had no love for adventure games and who was bottom line centered. He left after a year and change.
-Then the hiring of a CEO who worked for Nabisco, who left after two months.

So, you have Sierra ripped apart by illegalities on the part of its owner, which destroyed their profitability, internal instability caused by CUC/Cendant, Havas and Vivendi, layoffs which further crippled the company, and a rapid turnaround rate of CEOs, each of whom had differing visions, so you had turmoil because you had no one guy stay long enough to set a long term strategy, or even to provide short-term stability.

- Two Guys from Andromeda split up by Space Quest IV. Mandel left before the buyout (yes, I know he blames the suits as well, just like every tragi-comic artist developer in this fucking entertainment business). Space Quest 7 was in the works (with Scott Murphy back) but it was cancelled for various reasons. Sure, we can blame the suits again but let's not pretend it a smooth ride just until CUC bought them out and then it suddenly went mega-bumpy. The Space Quest franchise was already slowly drawing its last breath by that point.

SQ7 suffered from the new management for one lacking any interest in adventure games, secondly, they forced the game to be multiplayer; how can you make a true adventure game multiplayer, especially in 1997? They cancelled it because the SQ Collection in 1997 didn't sell as well as they wanted to. SQ5 and SQ6 had been financial hits and each title had outsold the other.

- QfG was released in 98 with Lori Ann Cole as designer. From what I've read on the Internet, Sierra didn't even want to do a new Quest for Glory but succumbed to fan pressure.

QFG5 went through a lot of hell due to CUC and Vivendi. There's an interview on youtube with the Coles about this.

- I've already covered Roberta Williams, King's Quest 8 and Phantasmagoria.

Phantasmagoria, like it or not, was a hit and was pretty well received critically at the time. It was the biggest selling game in Sierra's entire history, it brought them millions in revenue. KQ8 was troubled by many issues, but the resulting game we got was more the work of executives who demanded RPG elements and more and more combat to be like Tomb Raider. Roberta's idea before Sierra was sold was for a massive, sprawling Daggerfall-esque world in full 3D, but a pure adventure game. The only foes would be seven boss characters in each realm. The execs wanted none of that. So, KQ8 became what it became. There's a book which describes in detail how utterly depressed Roberta became over the course of that game's development, it's why she's never done a single game since.

After Cendant you get Vivendi, who micromanaged the shit out of Sierra, and because of this, you have a lot of key people leave. You also had 3 separate layoff events in one year alone which wiped out a 1/3rd of the company in a move to save the profitability of the company. You had crappy games developed by third party developers on the cheap because of this fiscal crisis. Even when Sierra would publish hits (such as Half-Life and Homeworld), Vivendi would only tighten the grip. You can read stories of Vivendi axing away at Sierra in the early 2000s and slowly asborbing Sierra, while "Blizzard is not affected by these cuts". By 2002, Sierra was a shell. Most of its functions were run by Vivendi; most of the core staff from the 80s/90s was gone; They only had two in-house development studios left, Dynamix was shut by Vivendi. In 2004, Vivendi decided to shut Sierra down as a real company and use Sierra's name on every Vivendi Games product. Sierra in essence became Vivendi Games, which is what Al Lowe refers to. Suddenly you see Sierra's name and logo on products like Spyro the Dragon and the like - stuff that had belonged to Vivendi beforehand.

- Jim Walls left after PQ3, long before the buyout.

Yes, but you had PQ become SWAT, which while different was successful in and of itself.

- Gabriel Knight in 99 by Jane Jensen.

And Sierra's new CEO declared that GK3 would be their last adventure game.

- Sierra was already trending towards the publishing business before the buyout. I recall both Dynamix and Impressions games were bought by the early 90s, as well as other companies. And this was Ken's doing, not the job of CUC/Cendant or Hamas or Vivendi.

Wrong. Sierra operated on a model that they bought companies to add to their development talent. Sierra had developers at Bellevue, at Oakhurst, and then at Dynamix, Impressions and about a dozen other companies. These were all in-house development studios; all of whom were "part of the Sierra family." They only started using 3rd party developers and acting as a publisher after 1999 (after Cendant and the new CEO shut down most of their development studios).

If you read some of the interviews and articles from the net about these games and Sierra games at that point, you'll notice how many of them thought it was necessary to go for 3-D graphics and/or multiplayer, or how the "low sales" of Grim Fandango just made everyone lose faith in the adventure genre.
I know, it's prettier to imagine that everything at Sierra was all sunshine, everyone was nicely developing beautiful and complex 2-D adventure games, bringing back a more complex parser and having fun all around. Then the evil corporate people burst into the door, put a gun to Ken Williams' head and took over the company, then shat on everything because they hated making money or something.

A lot of this push for 3D and multiplayer was on the part of the new management team(s). And a bunch of companies were jumping away from adventure games at around the same time. It wasn't fun to work at Sierra just before CUC, but that was more a result of the suits than anything else (as well as Ken becoming more and more businessman-like as time went on). Sierra was a public company whose obligation was to their shareholders. Basically, they were the Activision of the 1990s. What was once a fun, laid back easy going company had become pretty corporate by the mid 1990s. But this only sucks if you're a major adventure game fan. When you have an obligation to shareholders, you have an obligation to produce quarterly results, not what fans of an increasingly niche genre love, as sad as that is.

Look, I'm not saying that the suits were innocent or something, that's far from the reality. FFS, that guy Forbes is in jail as we speak, he was obviously a giant asshole. I'm just saying that Sierra people deserve a big part of the blame as well IMO. Again, I'm not the biggest fan of Blizzard but you can't deny that this company was under similar circumstances and managed to pull it off with more than grace. Starcraft was also delayed as fuck, filled with technological and development issues. They also cancelled an adventure game around that time. Both Sierra and Blizzard at the time were big, best sellers on the PC market yet only one of them thrived into the 21st century. It's a bit unfair to accuse Sierra of being 100% corrupted by empty suits, yet Blizzard was allowed to do whatever they fuck they wanted and make games millions of people love.

Blizzard's circumstances were radically different. They had a clause in their contract which allowed them to have full creative autonomy regardless of who they were owned by. This predated CUC - it was part of the agreement which they made when Davidson bought them. It stated they would have full creative autonomy, which is the only reason they accepted being bought by Davidson (who had made edutainment only); they were smart, as well and had that clause grandfathered in. They were also insulated by virtue of being a subsidiary of a subsidiary and by being so tiny; their accounts weren't used in illegalities and so their company wasn't crippled. Sierra was one of the main jewels in CUC Software's crown and was used as such. But, Blizzard had some rough times under Vivendi as well. A number of key Blizzard employees jumped ship due to Vivendi suffocating Blizzard's management, and in 2005, Vivendi ordered Blizzard North closed because they didn't like the looks of one game they were developing. Blizzard got lucky and happened to develop a cashcow called WoW, and due to the clause in their contract, they weren't micromanaged. It also helped that Blizzard's founding CEO remained with the company the whole time and is still there. Ken was gone within a year after CUC bought Sierra due to the reasons I've mentioned, and his hand-picked successor also jumped ship at roughly the same time.

Well, you're technically right. But it's not like Homeworld was developed and released in 1999, it started back in 1997 or so. Also, Sierra ws not doing better during the Havas/Vivendi years, that's when the actual layoffs started. Of course, the scandal with Cendant started everything but it wasn't that company that fired Al Lowe and Scott Murphy, it was the one that bought them next.

Sierra was doing great until 1998 when the Cendant scandal happened. Yes, Cendant fired Scott Murphy. Scott was fired in February 1998; Havas didn't buy Sierra until December 1998. Al Lowe was never an employee of Sierra in the true sense (nor was Scott). They worked on contract and were paid per game; they were not salaried full time employees. This was something which had been in place since the '80s mind you - Sierra's designers since 1983 were not employees, they signed multi-year or per-game contracts; Cendant and Havas decided not to renew Scott, Al or Jane Jensen's contracts. Even Roberta Williams was not an employee of Sierra. She was, prior to 1996, a major shareholder obviously, but she wasn't a fulltime salaried worker, and after the sale she was just a contracted designer like the rest.
 
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That was a great read Korgoth, but if you're going to write that sort of diatribe (and believe me, I love it that you did) then you need to cite your (preferably primary) sources, otherwise it's hard to parse your text for bias.
 

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Korgoth = Ken Williams.

That would literally and actually be the best thing ever.
 
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Here's some sources for stuff:

Sierra's growth and industry leadership up to 1998:

"The company went public in 1989, and a second offering followed in 1992, when sales were $41.7 million. The year 1993 proved to be a bleak one and losses were reported in 1994 as well. Sierra relocated its headquarters and moved to the Seattle area in 1993. Ken Williams cited difficulties convincing senior executives to move to rural Oakhurst, California as the prime reason for the move. In the same year, Sierra bought Coktel Vision, headquartered in Paris, which published both education and entertainment software. Ken Williams stated that Sierra's goal was to become the leader in educational software. To this end, Sierra and Western Publishing Group Inc., a leading publisher of children's books, joined in developing interactive software for children aged three to eight under Western's 'Golden Step Ahead' brand. Children's Television Workshop, producers of 'Sesame Street,' announced plans to create a show based on Sierra's Dr. Brain math and science series. Sierra Education also marketed and developed such titles as Berlitz Live! and Talking Tutors. A 1995 joint venture with Pioneer Electronic Corp. established a presence in Japan through Sierra Pioneer, Inc. European sales were worth $15.7 million in 1995 and American sales hit $60.7 million. Other exports, including Canada and Asia, were worth $5.0 million.

With $90 million in cash available in 1995, Sierra shopped for underdeveloped companies in fields beyond the highly seasonal entertainment and educational software markets. To round out its strategy games, Sierra bought Cambridge, Massachusetts-based Impressions Software. Sports, auto racing, and flight simulation offerings were beefed up with the purchase of Papyrus Design Group (Watertown, Massachusetts) and SubLogic (Champaign, Illinois), respectively. Home productivity, however, was the focus of Sierra's 1995 acquisitions. The rights to Print Artist, a desktop publishing program for producing greeting cards and banners, were acquired from The Pixellite Group, a group of ten California developers. Green Thumb Software and Arion added gardening and cooking titles to the Sierra line. P.F. Collier embarked on a joint venture with Sierra to produce a multimedia encyclopedia. Sierra breezed into the kitchen with its 1995 purchase of Arion Software's MasterCook series. The series offered a way to manage a database of recipes, as well as scale down the ingredients to produce differing numbers of servings. Although the adventure category's share of Sierra's sales fell to 36 percent in 1995 from 47.4 percent the previous year, education sales hovered around 14 percent. Most of the growth came in the simulation category, nearly doubling from 15.2 percent to 27.9 percent.

The company's products were distributed in at least 50 countries in the mid-1990s. Sierra's recent acquisition spree left it with a plethora of software offerings, allowing it to compete with the likes of Microsoft and Broderbund Software. At the same time, the firm's diverse content brought it to the attention of consumer services company CUC International. Sierra agreed to be acquired by CUC in a $1.06 billion stock swap. The deal, announced in February 1996, gave Sierra access to CUC's powerful marketing abilities and its outreach of more than 40 million customers. Sierra eventually operated as part of Cendant Software--after a CUC name change to Cendant Corporation--along with Knowledge Adventure, Davidson & Associates Inc., and Blizzard Entertainment. The Cendant Software unit was touted as one of the largest PC consumer software groups in the world.

Under new ownership, Sierra continued to grow and develop new software. In April 1997, the firm purchased Berkeley Systems, a publisher known for its You Don't Know Jack series, its After Dark screen saver series, and the bezerk network. Sierra also acquired Books That Work, a software developer dedicated to home-related projects. The company continued to focus on introducing new software. Some of its offerings included the Mission Force: Cyberstorm game; a new version of its Print Artist; Print Artist 4.0 Platinum; and the Software Companion for PalmPilot.

As consolidation continued to sweep through the retail software market, Cendant's arsenal of companies anchored its position as a top player in the market. In August 1998, it secured 16.8 percent of the retail market, just ahead of The Learning Company's 16.2 percent, and Microsoft's 10.7 percent. Although Sierra flourished under Cendant Software, parent company Cendant Corp. was faltering under a mountain of debt. As part of its plan to restructure and sell off its noncore assets, Cendant Corp. sold its software publishing arm to Paris-based Havas S.A. for roughly $800 million. In January 1999, Cendant Software became Havas Interactive and operated as worldwide leader of interactive content with Sierra among its holdings."

Principal Competitors: The Learning Company; Microsoft Corp.
- http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/sierra-on-line-inc-history/

Sierra's status as the marketshare leader in PC gaming until 1998:

Can a software company move from a small town in California to Bellevue, in the very shadow of Microsoft, and emerge among the giants in its niche of the industry?

Sierra On-Line Inc. is trying.

The company went on a corporate buying binge last year, acquiring five small software companies, and expects to continue the shopping spree this year.

Sierra's goal: Diversify beyond its traditional base of adventure and simulation games for personal computers into other game types, education software and titles that help consumers do useful home tasks.

Already, Sierra has the largest market share of the PC-game business, and it hopes to use a growing stable of education and home software titles to take its traditional game customers into other areas.

Led by its new financially oriented president, Michael Brochu, Sierra's 1995 acquisitions added about 200 employees and new product categories ranging from airline flight simulators to auto racing to software for working with food and recipes to programs for designing homes and gardens.

"This is driven by our strategy to be the premiere home entertainment, home education and home productivity provider in the world," said Brochu, who was hired in 1994 as Sierra's chief financial officer and became president and chief operating officer last October.

The goal of the company, which moved from California to Bellevue two years ago this month, is to be among the major survivors in an industry that's consolidating along the lines of movie studios, Brochu said.

Keith Benjamin, an analyst at Robertson Stephens in San Francisco, said: "My view is this business is going to evolve just like the music, movie and video businesses, and there will be only a handful of studios that survive. In my estimation, Sierra will end up as one of those major studios or as part of one of them."

"Studio" seems to be the accepted metaphor in the electronic-game business, where companies create "stars" and leverage their success by pumping out a variety of products that will be shown, played and collected.

Sierra's main competitors in the PC-game business are Broderbund and Electronic Arts. Novato, Calif.-based Broderbund, which makes PC products for homes, schools and small businesses, had sales of $171.6 million in the year ended last August. Electronic Arts of San Mateo, Calif., specializes in entertainment software not only for personal computers but also for console games such as those made by Sega and Nintendo (a much larger business). The company had sales of $493 million in its latest fiscal year.

At Sierra, Brochu declined to be specific about his acquisition plans for 1996.

"We are looking to deepen and broaden our product line, and it's all focused on the home consumer," Brochu said. Five years from now, Sierra "will be much bigger, and over half of our distribution will be products distributed and played over the Internet."

When Sierra bought SubLogic Inc. in 1995, it put itself in head-to-head competition with Microsoft in the flight-simulator game category. For more than a dozen years, Microsoft's "Flight Simulator" has been one of the best-selling entertainment software programs ever.

Microsoft is developing a Windows 95 version of "Flight Simulator," which was originally developed elsewhere (partly by SubLogic).

When it picked up SubLogic with a handful of employees last year, Sierra acquired a slow-selling product called "Flight Light," similar to a previous version of "Flight Simulator." More importantly, it acquired flight-simulation technology, which Sierra says it will develop into a series of Windows 95 products that will be what Sierra calls "the first serious alternative" to Microsoft's "Flight Simulator."

Last year's acquisitions mark a new level of maturity for Sierra, which won't say how much it paid for the companies it bought. But analysts believe each deal was done for less than four times the acquired company's annual sales, which is quite low for software acquisitions.

When it moved to Bellevue, the company was saddled with owning a large stake in a money-losing online network called ImagiNation, which had sapped profits from Sierra's popular games such as "King's Quest," a perennial best seller.

Sierra lost $8.4 million and $8.7 million, respectively, in the fiscal years ending March 1993 and 1994, even though sales grew from $49.7 million in fiscal 1993 to $62.7 million the following year.

Much of Brochu's first year on the job was spent getting the finances straightened out. He cut costs, sold the company's interest in the ImagiNation Network to AT&T and restored the company to profitability. For the year ended last March, Sierra had $11.9 million in profit on $83.4 million in sales.

"That gave Mike a chance to inventory the company's competitive strengths and figure out how to leverage them," said Scott McAdams, an analyst for Ragen MacKenzie Inc. in Seattle.

Those strengths: cash, a solid distribution network, a credible brand name in the game industry and the ability to manage the creative process of not only developing a game but also of doing it on time and within a budget.

Brochu's strategy: Use the company's cash, which totaled nearly $100 million last March 31, to find other software titles and companies that could use those strengths.

"That's what he's been doing, and he has not overpaid for anything he has bought," McAdams said. He and other analysts believe the acquisitions will start pouring profits into Sierra this year.

Brochu's first buy last year was Green Thumb Software Inc. of Boulder, Colo., which makes software for designing or remodeling homes and gardens.

Judy McNary, a co-founder of the company and its president a year ago, found Sierra's pitch hard to resist.

"We were at a point where we had a good product and good ideas for producing it, but we had to either renew our contract with our distributor, launch our own distribution operations or merge with somebody," said McNary, who still runs the company in Boulder and now has the title of "producer" at Sierra.

Selling to Sierra "gave us the chance to keep doing the core things which we liked, which was developing the product," she said.

McNary was happy to have Sierra take over many job functions that she found necessary but less than fun. "Now we can concentrate on what we like without worrying about things like manufacturing, inventory and accounting."

David McDonald, who started Arion Software Inc. in Texas in 1991, last year found himself with a popular software product for working with food, menus and recipes - but without the resources to develop the product to its potential. He sold the company to Sierra last May.

"They have taken away all the aspects of our jobs that we hated, the administrative stuff, the payroll, contracts, the kinds of things that software developers hate to do like sales and marketing," McDonald said. "Their model was to keep the entrepreneurial spirit that made us what we are. They like to keep us entrepreneurial, a separate group."

That is a critical part of Brochu's sales pitch to the small software-development companies he wants to buy.

Analyst Benjamin said, "A lot of the reason game developers come up with the best games is that they are having a good time. Sierra is a fun place." Sierra founder and chairman Ken Williams "has a history of putting games first, and he has created one of the most friendly atmospheres for game developers on the planet," Benjamin said.

McAdams estimates Sierra's sales will be $130 million in the fiscal year that will end March 31. Brochu said 60 percent of the company's business is entertainment, 30 percent education titles and 10 percent home productivity.

Partly to increase the shelf life of its products and partly to mitigate the extremely seasonal nature of games, Sierra is trying to build its educational business.

McAdams predicts Sierra will turn in profit of $15.8 million in its current fiscal year. In fiscal 1997, he estimates profit of $20.5 million on sales of $170 million. Other analysts expect Sierra's profit to continue rising about 30 percent a year for the rest of the decade.

But the consolidation of the industry may change those expectations.

"In order to end up in the top ranks, Sierra probably needs to make a reasonably large acquisition or merger," said Benjamin. "There are very few private companies left out there of any size, so (any Sierra acquisitions) would probably be in the public arena. Most of the companies that are any good have already gone public."

And that leads to the ultimate question about the future of Sierra: Will it end up being the buyer or the merchandise, the predator or the prey?

"It is hard to tell," said Benjamin. "I would not be very surprised either way."

Sierra investors have had a wild ride the past few years as the stock gradually moved from about $10 a share in mid-1994 to stabilize at about $20 last spring, then shot up to a high of $46.625 last September. The stock fell sharply last fall and has been trading between $20 and $30 since mid-December.

--------------------------------------------------------.

Sierra On-Line's recent acquisitions.

-- November 1995: Papyrus Design Group, Watertown, Mass. Produces auto-racing games. Employees: 100. Adds a popular product category and beefs up Sierra's simulations and sports offerings.

-- November 1995: SubLogic Inc., Champaign, Ill. Produces non-military flight-simulation games. Employees: 12. Adds a popular product category to sports and simulations area. Will share technology with Papyrus.

-- September 1995: Arion Software Inc., Austin, Texas. Produces cooking software. Employees: 12.

-- June 1995: Impressions Software Inc., Cambridge, Mass. Produces strategy games. Employees: 40. Adds strategy games to Sierra's traditional strong offerings in adventure, sports and simulation games.

-- May 1995: Green Thumb Software Inc., Boulder, Colo. Produces landscape-design software. Employees: 10. Green Thumb and Arion both help Sierra create a home productivity category with products expected to have longer shelf lives and less seasonal sales patterns than games.
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960122&slug=2310224


BELLEVUE, Wash.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--May 14, 1996--Sierra On-Line Inc., the marketshare leader of the PC entertainment industry, and America Online, the nation's largest online service, today announced an agreement to develop and launch The Realm, an open-ended online adventure environment.

Scheduled to release this summer, The Realm is a medieval fantasy world that will allow thousands of players to interact with one another in a real-time graphic adventure setting. Combining the social elements of chat with the visual and exploration components of Sierra's adventure and role playing games, The Realm will allow AOL members to embark on a completely new kind of quest.

Unlike the visual chat environments or text-based MUDs (multi-user dungeons) currently available, The Realm will enable players to immerse themselves in an evolving adventure fantasy. Players will create characters by choosing gender, physical attributes, clothing, personality characteristics and special skills.
- http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Sierra+and+America+Online+announce+agreement+to+launch+The+Realm;...-a018280380

Bellevue, WA, January 28th, 1998 -- Sierra On-Line, Inc., the market share leader of interactive entertainment software, announced today the creation of Sierra Sports, a brand division of Cendant Software that brings together the product, talent, resources and prestigious histories of the most respected development names in interactive sports entertainment. All Cendant Software sports product, including titles formerly marketed under the Papyrus and Front Page Sports brand names, will be consolidated under the Sierra Sports umbrella.
http://www.csoon.com/issue31/p_siera2.htm


A bit on Michael Brochu, Ken Williams' chosen successor who led Sierra through a huge time of growth from 95 to 97:

Michael Brochu, president of Sierra On-Line Inc., spent most of 1995 on a major buying spree in an effort to rapidly grow the entertainment software company. But in early 1996, Sierra itself became the target in a deal that surprised Wall Street.
The Bellevue-based software company was bought by CUC International for nearly $1 billion.
At the same time, CUC, which offers discount club memberships via the telephone and more recently through online services, announced it also was buying Davidson & Associates Inc., a leader in educational software, for roughly $1 billion. That was a hefty price for a company that was on track to post sales of $150 million for its fiscal year ending in March 1996. CUC, a publicly traded company based in Stamford, Conn., is a newcomer to the software world, but it is no stranger to Sierra On-Line. CUC's chief executive, Walter Forbes, has been a member of Sierra's board of directors for five years.
The deals instantly made CUC one of the top consumer software companies in a rapidly consolidating industry where broad distribution and lots of money are essential to survival. The acquisition gave Sierra, the industry's top entertainment software company, increased leverage with distributors and retailers, as well as access to capital for additional marketing and continued acquisitions, Brochu said earlier this year. CUC is operating Sierra as a separate company and its headquarters remain in Bellevue, where some 250 of its 1,000 employees are based.
- http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/1996/12/30/story8.html

On how Sierra's name was used in CUC (aka Cendant's) illegal dealings:

"In August, an audit committee set up by Cendant's current Board of Directors launched an investigation. It concluded, in its report, that "more than one-third of the total income, excluding merger-related and unusual charges, reported by CUC during the Restatement Period was deliberately and fictitiously manufactured", so the company could meet Wall Street analysts' earnings expectations.

Among the Cendant subsidiaries that had their books examined were Sierra and Davidson. According to the report, operating income was inflated in 17of the 22 operating units of CUC, and Sierra and Davidson were involved in some of the irregular bookings.

Cendant's internal report gives one example of such behavior, involving Sierra:

"On January 8, 1997, and effective December 31, 1996, Comp-U-Card [a CUC subsidiary] charged the Ideon [another CUC subsidiary] reserve $1.1 million and transferred that amount, through an intercompany payable, to Sierra to cover 'integration' costs purportedly incurred by Sierra in the period leading up to and subsequent to the acquisition of Sierra by CUC."
-http://www.ign.com/articles/1998/09/30/cendant-admits-red-ink

On Sierra's business being split into three business units by CUC in late 1997:

Chris McLeod, chief executive officer of CUC Software, responded to last Friday's departure of Sierra On-line president Mike Broshu by restructuring that company and breaking the business into three units.

Three former vice presidents - Bill Moore, Scott Lynch, and Randy Dersham - were given the title senior vice president and put in charge of the new units.

Moore will be responsible for Sierra's Home Production line, Berkeley Systems line, and all on-line gaming products; Lynch will look after Sierra Northwest, Sierra Oakhurst, and Impressions Software; Dursham will be in charge of all sports-related projects including Papyrus and Front Page Sports products.

A Sierra spokesperson said there would be no layoffs as a result of the restructuring.

Broshu, who was with the company for three years, announced his departure to Sierra staffers on Friday, October 24. October 31 was his last day. Broshu moves to Seattle company Primus and assumes the position of president there.

A Sierra insider said the new structure will address an approval process that was perceived internally to be slow. In so far as CUC Software, Sierra's owner, having exerted a heavy hand in the reorg process, this person discounted any suggestion of that: "They leave us alone and let us market products as we want. Chris McLeod is very involved but he knows we're the experts."

On Vivendi chopping Sierra up:
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/1999/03/01/story1.html - 250 employees cut, adventure game division fired, 4 studios closed
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2001/08/13/daily19.html - 148 cut, Dynamix closed[/quote][/quote]
 
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On Ken being duped by CUC, and the conflict with Davidson & Associates

"After the company moved [to Bellevue] in 1993, our revenue exploded. I forget the exact numbers, but our revenue tripled or more between 1993 and 1996. Much of this growth was attributable to some great management we were to bring into the company. In particular, I should mention Mike Brochu, who came in as CFO, but later rose to be President - and, Dennis Cloutier, who was our VP Sales and is an incredible talent. Another name I can't forget is: Bill Moore, our VP Marketing. Bill had a consumer marketing background, with companies like Starbucks.

The short story on the sale is that we were a public company. I owned a lot of the company, but not all. My responsibility was to the shareholders, and to the employees. We were presented an offer that made financial sense for both of these contingencies, so I had to take it. I also thought it was the right long-term decision for the company.

At the time, I thought that it was a win-win for both shareholders and Sierra. The company that acquired Sierra also acquired Blizzard, and had plans to do other acquisitions. The goal was to create a major entertainment company, with even better distribution for Sierra products. Unfortunately, the company that acquired Sierra turned out to have falsified its financials, and several members of its management team are facing very possible jail time.

The Sierra acquisition turned out to be a total disaster, both for shareholders (and option holders) and for employees - most of which lost their jobs.

After Sierra was sold, my vision had been that the new owners would WANT Roberta and I to continue doing games. I was always jealous of our own developers. They got to build cool products, and I got to go to meetings. My vision post-sale was that I would be able to focus on doing product - and try to build one hit game per year.

Unfortunately, that's not how it works in the real world. I hate to sound bitter (which I'm not) - but, when someone buys your company, they want to do things their way - not yours. I'm not making this up, and it isn't something that was unique to Sierra. It is common, in business, that post acquisition, the prior regime gets flushed. Neither Roberta, Al or me were ever offered another game at Sierra."

At the time we were acquired, the company wasn't for sale. Walter Forbes had been on our board for a number of years, and blindsided me after a board meeting [in February 1996] with the offer of acquisition.

In the weeks following his (Walter's) proposal there were intense negotiations, and the deal almost fell apart several times. Price was certainly an issue, although the price was the simplest issue negotiated. We resolved the price almost immediately.

The huge issue was the management of the company post-acquisition. I needed to believe that the company would retain its independence after the acquisition and be able to continue producing great product. After intense negotiations, a structure was put in place that I believed would result in a major win for Sierra's employees and customers.

Walter Forbes vision was to roll together all of the larger software companies, creating one huge entertainment company. The acquisition of Davidson (Blizzard) and Sierra was really intended as just the beginning.

We agreed that the non-creative groups, such as manufacturing and distribution would be consolidated, but that the product groups would retain their independence. A complex structure was put in place that not only gave me clear command of Sierra, but also visibility and influence over all of the products across the consolidated company. This would allow me to focus on what I did best (product) while creating a distribution company that could deal with the operational issues.

The deal would not have closed were I not convinced that it was in the best interests of ALL of Sierra's employees, customers and shareholders.

Almost immediately after the deal closed I realized that things were not going to be as we had planned, and not all of the problems were with the acquiring company. Sierra's sales force was consolidated with Davidsons, and there were problems with the Davidson sales force selling Sierra products. They had been selling educational software which had a very different sales profile than computer games. There were also issues with a cultural difference between selling preschool software and Leisure-Suit Larry. Some of our biggest hits were offensive to some people at Davidson. It was an issue no one had expected.

Prior to the acquisition, the potential for these kinds of problems had been discussed.

A structure was put in place to deal with them, and it was all ignored. A software board was to have been created, but it never had a single meeting. I do not know why. Also, Bob Davidson, who was running all sales for the consolidated company suddenly left the company. I felt that I, or someone from my senior management team, should have been installed to run the company, but CUC brought in a member of their senior management with no experience in software. I was frustrated and unhappy, and wound up leaving the software business entirely.
-http://www.sierragamers.com/ken-williams

and

At the time of the acquisition of Davidson and Sierra, the two companies were flying high. Sierra was dominant in entertainment and Davidson was dominant in education. Actually it was a perfect marriage in that Sierra lead the market in education outside the US, and Davidson had an entertainment hit in their Blizzard subsidiary. Together, the two companies should have been unstoppable.

Unfortunately, it sounds easier as a theory, than it was as a reality. When first approached by CUC, about being acquired, I was fine. But, then when CUC spoke about their strategy of consolidating us with Davidson, I worried that it was a 'marriage doomed to failure'. There were companies I could envision being teamed with, but Davidson wasn't one of them. I had tremendous respect for Bob Davidson, and thought he was a brilliant businessman. But, I didn't think he was the right guy to run a combined Sierra/Davidson, and I didn't think he would be willing to subordinate his company to Sierra. On this basis, I refused to 'do the deal.'

My fear had to do with Sierra's product line, rather than anything personal. Sierra published a wide range of products, including both entertainment and education products. Davidson also published both entertainment and education. That Davidson could publish children's education AND Warcraft was a positive. However, during the negotiations, there were rumors that Bob and Jan Davidson were concerned about Leisure-Suit Larry and Phantasmagoria -- two of Sierra's biggest hits. To me, it was clear that they were non-supporters of the products. Putting Davidson in charge of selling these products, which were a huge percentage of our revenue, I felt would be a mistake. I just didn't think it would work.

During the negotiations, CUC convinced me that the 'Davidson Issue' was a 'non-issue.' CUC put a structure in place which created a consolidation of non-product related functions, such as manufacturing, while leaving Sierra and Davidson independent for the purpose of creating product. In other words, I was assured that only non-product related groups would be merged. Davidson would not be dictating product strategy at Sierra, and neither of us would be reporting to the other. This is quite different than what actually happened.

One the deal was done,Bob Davidson was put in charge. However, even this had problems -CUC and Davidson had their own conflict, which resulted in Bob Davidson leaving the company. By the time all this occured, I had been transferred out of the software business, and neither CUC nor I wanted me to get reinvolved. At the time, I used to say 'Put Bob Davidson, or myself in charge of software, but don't ask us to co-exist. Either of us could do the job, but WE can't do it together.' Bob won the short-term battle to run the software business, but then he and his new bosses didn't get along. My personal theory is that it's possible that they didn't get along because Bob sensed that things weren't completely right at CUC (several members of CUC's management have been found guilty of, or admitted to, 'cooking the books'.)
= http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.13499.56263

CUC put me on the board as Vice Chairman, and also into the Office of the President, in response to my fears that Sierra would be ruined by being part of CUC. They also formed a software board, which I was to be part of, that was to make the important decisions for the software business. I wanted to know that I had the power required within the organization to give Sierra the maximum chance of surviving. I refused to support the transaction unless I thought there would be a viable software business post-transaction.

Unfortunately, they were just telling me what I wanted to hear, to get the deal done. My titles gave me no power, and I dropped almost all involvement in the software business immediately after the acquisition.

It was a very painful time.

-Ken W
- http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.13497.56246

I left the company in Nov 1997, however I really stopped running Sierra much earlier. The company was officially acquired in June 1996, and I started immediately working on an online shopping project. Cendant acquired Sierra and Davidson simultaneously, and made the decision to put Bob Davidson in charge of all of software. Bob is a good guy, but I really didn’t want to work for him, so I deliberately wanted out of running Sierra.

I thought I was going to at least stay involved at the product level, but it just wasn’t working. I think I only attended one product meeting after the deal was done.
- http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.52458.292529




On how CUC radically changed KQ8 - Ken Williams:
KQ8 is a wild story.
KQ8 was in development at the same time that the company was sold. Basically, Sierra went through changes during the development of the game, and those changes are reflected in the game. During the first half of the game, I was the CEO - during the last half of the game my status shifted to "reasonably nice guy who used to work here". My way of doing things was different than the new way of doing things.

My #1 issue was always to maintain the "clarity of vision" of the game designer. A Sierra project, like KQ8, has nearly a hundred highly creative people on it. Many of these people were working at Sierra because they wanted their shot to be a game designer. It was not uncommon for everyone on a project to seek opportunities to "put their mark" on the game. This is a delicate issue. I recruited people who could be designers, and I was a huge supporter of creativity. Roberta wanted ideas from the team, but at some point, if you accept too many ideas, the product can become a muddy mess. There were dozens of people on KQ8 who could have been the designer, any of which would have made a great designer. But, unfortunately, if this tendency, on the part of developers, to add their creativity to a product, isn't carefully controlled, the product starts to veer into "design by committee". Roberta had her vision for the product, as did almost every person on the project.

When I lost control of Sierra, Roberta's ability to maintain her control over KQ8 was also eroded. The product that shipped is very different than what would have shipped had the company not been sold.

There was another issue at work on KQ8. Roberta is a perfectionist (I'm guilty of the same sin). Whenever she would play the game, she would turn in lists of hundreds of "bugs". Perfectionist can be a pseudonym for nit-picker. When a development team gets a long list, the natural tendency can be to look at some bugs as nit-picky. I always supported my designers. I wouldn't let a game go until the designer was happy (with a couple of exceptions that I regretted later), even when it seemed like we were spending lots of money to fix stuff no one cared about. It was critical to me that the game our customers played represented the game our designer wanted produced. When I left Sierra, Roberta's ability to get bugs fixed diminished.

Ultimately, the last year of KQ8 development was a tough one for Roberta. For a long time, she refused to let the game ship and there was threatened litigation floating around.

This is not to say that the game that shipped isn't a good game. Roberta was reasonably happy with it at the end - but, it reflected a much wider product vision, than Roberta's alone. People other than Roberta influenced its development, in a greater capacity than in her previous products. There will be some gamers who see the change as positive, and some who wanted a Roberta product more consistent with her prior products.

There is an example I used to use on this point. One of my favorite authors is: Steven King. I also like Peter Straub. Each alone is a bestselling (mega-selling in Kings case) author. They co-wrote a book; the Talisman, which bombed. Either alone could have sold plenty of copies, but together, the whole becomes less than the parts. KQ8 had wonderful people on it. This message should not be construed as being derogatory to anyone (other than that I am definitely critical of the management changes that took place.) My belief is that if the new owners had taken a couple of days to ask about "what made Sierra special" in the days after acquiring it (they could have asked me, or better yet, its customers) before dramatically changing things, things would have gone a lot smoother in the transition.

MOE had a very different flavor from the earlier Kings Quest games. The 'rest of the story' is that it was developed after I left Sierra, and that there were multiple opinions as to what the game should be. When I was running the company, these differences were not an issue, because everyone knew my position on the matter. I always felt that a game is like a book, and that there should only be one author, or one creative vision, for the product, and that the game needs to sink or swim with a single vision. It was Roberta's game, and needed to be her vision. Typically, on a game, there are 100s of people, and most of them are 'wanna be’ game designers. They look for every opportunity to show off their creativity, and prove to the world that they should be the next hot designer. I understand and respect this, but it really just screws up the product. I would argue that if you were to publish a book, with the top 200 authors who ever lived each writing one page, it might have good press value, but would be an unreadable book.
With me gone from Sierra, Roberta's ability to force the project to be her vision, alone, was compromised. It suddenly became a group effort, with lots of smart people each having their own ideas. Sierra hired only the best, so they weren't bad ideas, but they weren't Roberta's ideas. The game became a mish mash of lots of people's good ideas, but clearly not a Roberta game. There was even a period where Sierra wanted to release the game, and Roberta wouldn’t allow her name on it. After a bunch of negotiation, and changes to the product, to mosey it back towards what she designed, it did finally release.

Kings Quest was less of an adventure game because it was less of a Roberta game. KQ8 was in development at the same time the company was sold. The new owners made the decision to NOT give Roberta the same unwavering support that I had - and, other people were able to get their ideas into the game. Some of these ideas were great ideas, but they weren't Robertas. Ultimately, KQ8 was a bust, and I suspect Sierra blames Roberta, although I have no way of knowing. In hers and my opinion, her track record speaks for itself; 15 (or so) hits done when she had control of a project, and one disaster, which just happened to be the one where she didn't have control. The whole thing was a mess, and was settled amongst threats of litigation.
With respect to when adventure games stopped selling, I don't know. Great games have always sold, and mediocre games have always bombed. I'm confident that if Al Lowe did a Larry 8 today, it would sell as well as it ever would have. By this I do not mean that it should look exactly like prior games. Every game has a responsibility to move the state of the art forward. Resting on status quo is a formula for disaster. In other words, a new adventure game would sell - if it were innovative, AND a good game. You need both.
-Ken W
http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.4111.19599

[KQ8 is another story. Roberta was not happy with the game, and fought its release. Prior to the sale of the company I "protected" the game designers, such that the game they wanted released would be their design as they intended it. After the company was sold Roberta felt like she lost this support, and lost control of the game. Her ability to make the game what she wanted was diminished. Ultimately, a game was released that represented the bare minimum that she was willing to put her name on, as opposed to something that she was proud of.[/quote] - http://www.sierragamers.com/Forum/bbs/Topic.52406.292305
 
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Among the Cendant subsidiaries that had their books examined were Sierra and Davidson. According to the report, operating income was inflated in 17of the 22 operating units of CUC, and Sierra and Davidson were involved in some of the irregular bookings.

Cendant's internal report gives one example of such behavior, involving Sierra:

"On January 8, 1997, and effective December 31, 1996, Comp-U-Card [a CUC subsidiary] charged the Ideon [another CUC subsidiary] reserve $1.1 million and transferred that amount, through an intercompany payable, to Sierra to cover 'integration' costs purportedly incurred by Sierra in the period leading up to and subsequent to the acquisition of Sierra by CUC.

"Sierra then used the intercompany transfer it had received from Corporate to offset costs that previously had been charged to expense. The expense reductions were booked to the month of October, 1996... This had the effect of reducing expense and increasing fiscal 1997 income by $1.1 million." (Emphasis ours).

According to Cendant's own report, this is bad accounting:

"The costs which were offset against the intercompany transfer do not qualify as merger-related costs but instead represent normal operating costs. Because these costs should not have been charged against the Ideon reserve, the charge is being reversed as part of the Restatement."

This incident involving Sierra was only one of many irregularities detailed in the report, though the report suggests that Sierra's accountants were acting on orders from above.
http://www.ign.com/articles/1998/09/30/cendant-admits-red-ink
 
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In December, 1997, Sattler contacted Brian Foster, corporate accounting manager of the Sierra Division of CUC Software, and told him that Pember wanted Sierra to calculate the "excess" that was remaining in an $11 million purchase accounting reserve that had been established in connection with Sierra's April, 1997 acquisitions of Berkeley Systems ("Berkeley") and Books That Work (the "Berkeley reserve"). Sattler said that Pember wanted Sierra to transfer that excess to Corporate through the intercompany account. The suggestion to do this originally came from Sabatino, who had told Pember in October, 1997 that Sierra should transfer the reserve to Corporate "so we can control it." See Appendix Ex. 69.

Foster calculated the remaining reserve needed to satisfy the outstanding severance agreements and other acquisition costs not yet paid out and determined that the "excess" Berkeley reserve was $5.4 million. Foster knew there was excess because when the reserve was initially established he had estimated a need for perhaps $6 or $7 million (primarily for severance costs), but Sabatino had directed Fred Schapelhouman, then Sierra's chief accounting officer, to record a reserve of $11 million ($6 million for severance and relocation payments and $5 million for lease cancellations and site closings).(122) Foster said Schapelhouman gave him the $11 million figure to book and that when Foster responded that it was excessive, Schapelhouman (who is no longer with the company) told him the number had come from Corporate so he had to book it. Sabatino said that he had been told by Corigliano to make sure that a reserve in the range of $10 to $12 million got booked.

On January 4, 1998, (effective December 31, 1997) Sierra debited the Berkeley reserve by $5.4 million and credited intercompany payable to Corporate by $5.4 million.(123) The Comp-U-Card division then debited intercompany receivable from Sierra $5.4 million and credited (increased) the Ideon reserve -- the $5 million was earmarked for site closings and lease cancellations and did not make sense to Foster. He was unaware of any site closings that were necessary in connection with the acquisition. There were some downsizing/consolidation costs associated with Berkeley which Foster said are nowhere near $5 million. He gave his best guess at about $500,000.

(123) Prior to transferring the excess reserve to Corporate, Foster had contacted Jay Meschel, CFO of Cendant Software, and told him he was concerned that even though Sierra was transferring its excess Berkeley reserve to Corporate, it was still carrying goodwill from the Berkeley acquisition on its books which required Sierra to take an ongoing "hit" to income in the form of amortization of goodwill. Foster had asked Sattler whether Corporate would be taking the goodwill along with the excess reserve and she told him no. Foster thought that Meschel should know this because, although Sierra did not need the reserve (and it made no difference on a consolidated basis), anyone evaluating the Software Division's operating performance should have an appreciation of the fact that Sierra was required to amortize the $5.4 million of excess goodwill prospectively.

The effect of the above entries was to move the excess merger reserve from Sierra's general ledger to Davidson's general ledger through the Comp-U-Card division's general ledger.

In April, 1997, when Sierra acquired Berkeley, there was included on Berkeley's pre-acquisition balance sheet a deferred tax asset of approximately $2.6 million against which Berkeley maintained a 100% valuation allowance. Sierra's accounting manager Brian Foster said that when Sierra established the opening post-acquisition balance sheet of Berkeley this deferred tax asset was excluded because he could obtain no backup supporting it from either Berkeley or from Price Waterhouse, Berkeley's prior auditors. Ultimately, because the deferred tax asset and the corresponding valuation allowance netted to zero, Foster decided not to book any entry for the asset or the allowance on the opening balance sheet.

Later, in November, 1997, Foster received a phone call from Pam Drake, the Controller of Davidson, informing him that Drake had spoken with Sabatino regarding the deferred tax asset and the valuation allowance. Drake informed Foster that Sabatino wanted to have Sierra reinstate the deferred tax asset and corresponding valuation allowance on Sierra's balance sheet. Foster resisted the suggestion because he had never been able to find satisfactory backup for the asset, and he told Drake that he did not want to make the entry. Drake, who described herself as a go-between on this issue, went back to Sabatino, who insisted upon the reinstatement of the asset on Sierra's books. Drake contacted Foster and told him that Sabatino really wanted the entry made and would he please put it on his books.

Foster believes that Sabatino contacted Drake (rather than Foster or someone else at Sierra directly) because Davidson was viewed as the head of CUC Software and had the most direct contact with CUC Corporate (Sabatino confirmed that he viewed Drake as the point person for software accounting matters). Foster believes he may have had a discussion in November with Meschel, the CFO for the Software division, regarding Sabatino's instruction to reinstate the deferred tax asset and corresponding valuation allowance. Drake said she spoke to Meschel about the request. Meschel said he recalled that the request came from Pember and/or Sabatino but that he did not recall hearing about any resistance from Foster to booking the entries.

Foster was uncomfortable with the entry primarily because he was unable to see the support for it. In connection with reinstating the asset, he had no discussions with anyone about the possibility that it would later be reversed into income. However, given the lack of support for the entry, in Foster's mind at the time, there was really no other reason to book such an entry other than to later move it into income.

Shortly thereafter, in either late December, 1997 or early January, 1998, Foster received a call from Drake informing him that Sabatino wanted Sierra to reverse the valuation allowance and credit the P&L. Foster said he "threw a fit" because Sabatino had insisted only weeks prior that Sierra reinstate the asset. Foster refused to book the entry and insisted on talking to Meschel first. Foster spoke to Meschel and Drake, both of whom told Foster that Sabatino wanted the transaction booked and that Foster had no choice but to book it.
http://apps.shareholder.com/sec/viewerContent.aspx?companyid=ABEA-36XVJR&docid=1272419
 
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Great read.

Al seems like a really kind and pretty down-to-Earth dude. I always forget that he had a career before even getting into game design, but I bet he was the kind of teacher that kids really loved and remembered.

My wife never took his class, but Al Lowe was the band teacher when she was in high school. That's the general impression she remembers.
 
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Fun fact: Impressions Games (Sierra’s subsidiary) was the most profitable studio run by Cendant in 1998, even beating Blizzard, due to how massively successful Caesar III was that year
 

Taluntain

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He's nulled, deleted or lorem ipsum'd all of his old posts manually here. Probably decided back then that his Codex presence must be purged, but then had a change of heart as he's posting again now, and not deleting his newer posts from what I can see.
 

I ASK INANE QUESTIONS

ITZ NEVER STOPS COOOMING
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Steve gets a Kidney but I don't even get a tag.
I really hope that at the end of the 2010s, the hipster/indie/neo-hippie phase will end and everybody will seriously return to the times when companies were business savvy, delivered quality products and had mass appeal because they knew how to treat their customers and how and when to innovate, no matter how big or small they were.
Heh.
 

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